Moral hazard is everywhere even at Universities. Academic tenure allegedly causes shirking. Today’s VC has an interesting discussion of this phenomena. I have a slightly different take. It is not just tenure, but the retirement systems which may cause future problems in academia.
Opponents of tenure (including me) claim professors obtain job security through tenure and and then supposedly stop working. I don’t see it everyday, but I know it happens. Dead wood likely abounds at US universities and it likely to get worse. This is, in part, due to the change in the universities’ retirement systems. Most younger professors (50 and below) have been switched to, or voluntarily chose, defined contribution plans. This is a common trend across universities and the private sector. In contrast, most older professors (50+) are on defined benefit plans. The DB-ers retire at 30 years of service because they get a “formula benefit” based on the highest three years of salary and the number of years of service. At some point it pays to quit as the pension approximates some relatively large percentage of full time pay.
In contrast, the each year the DC crowd keeps putting money into a retirement plan like a 401k. Some years the returns on the retirement portfolio are positive and in some years they are negative. If there is any economic uncertainty, the individual professor bears all of the risk of a market down turn. Thus, it makes sense to keep working if the market is in turmoil. Well, just about everyone thinks the market is in turmoil (even if it has had a couple of goods years). Further, one never knows, but the next crash could be just around the corner. So, the risk averse tenured professor decides to keep working even into his or her dotage. To compound the tenure problem there is no mandatory retirement age to “force” retirements. In Georgia (where I live) unlike other states like California, it is probably illegal or unconstitutional to offer buy out plans to faculty. I suspect we will be seeing in the future a large number of older professors like me graying at the vine.
I don’t really want to “force” professors to retire with a mandatory rule, but there is likely to be an optimal retirement age for many of us and we need to design a proper incentive system. Right now the individual’s incentive might be to go beyond that optimal retirement age. As people age they become more risk averse and are likely to stay employed (assuming they can handle the work) taking a guaranteed income rather then retire and face a potential variable income. In addition, each year of work provides an additional contribution to the retirement portfolio. However, each year of work beyond the optimal retirement age costs the university in terms of lower productivity (even if the professor is not “dead wood”). I can see private universities being able to have a greater ability to craft buy- out packages for their faculty. They will be able to compete by saying “Our faculty are young and dynamic and are in the prime of their research lives. Come to our school to study!” This places Georgia public universities at a disadvantage.
See also TIAA CREF Study, Marginal Revolution and links therein.
Recent Comments